The Last Austrian Cartridge in Tamaulipas

The Battle of Santa Gertrudis June 16th, 1866  and  The Liberation of the Northern Frontier



By

Gerardo S. Zuñiga Gtz.


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Introduction

The French Intervention in Mexico prove to be a disaster for the French but a blessing in disguise for Mexico since it emerged as a unified country. Of the many battles between the invading French and Mexicans, the Battle of Santa Gertrudis on June 16, 1866 prove to be a rally point for the ragged Mexican Army. It was a decisive victory for the Mexican army. After the battle, the effort couldn’t be sustained by the French Army and were force to retreat from the Northern Frontier.

Although not as famous as battle for Puebla on May 5th, or the siege of Queretaro in the summer of 1867, the Battle of Santa Gertrudis has gained national recognition and is still referred to in most Mexican text books. It is this same national attention that has distorted the events of the battle. The recounting of the events as most contemporary books show it is based on folklore rather than facts. The events were told and retold by the well-entrenched military establishment of the 1890’s and their view of the battle has become accepted as facts. For example, the original dispatches of Gen. Mariano Escobedo from May 27 to June 19, 1866 have been tossed aside by most historians. It is surprising that they were last published in 1867 and have not been reproduced since. Gen. M. Escobedo’s dispatches seemed to have been forgotten and have been substituted by a collage of views and opinions. One vivid example is the accepted version that the Austrians had over 1,500 American troops among their ranks. The presence of these Americans is totally unproven and no record of Americans among the Austrians have been recorded. Therefore, it is imperative to discern fact from fiction by revisiting the events of the battle and have as a foundation accounts and official papers that have survived the folds of time.

By casting aside all folklore, nationalism, patriotism, and politics, can one begin to understand what happened on June 16, 1866 on the hills of Santa Gertrudis. Also, historians have used a narrow view and have focused only on the battle itself. Moreover, research on the origins of the battle has not been done. In order to understand the effect and the aftermath of the battle on the northern frontier of Tamaulipas, one has to understand the outcome of the Mexican Reform War.
 

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Intervention!

On December 22nd, 1860 two armies met to dispute the political future of Mexico. On the hills by the small village named San Miguel Calpulalpan they clashed and the outcome would redirect Mexico’s outlook for the next fifty years. On one side was Gen. Miguel Miramón for the Conservatives with about 8,000 men and opposing him was Liberal Gen. Jesus Gonzalez Ortega with a comparable force. The battle turned out to be a complete disaster for Gen. Miramón. Gen. Gonzalez Ortega carried the day after vicious fighting and completely routed Gen. Miramon’s troops.

With the outcome at Calpulalpan, the victorious Liberal army entered Mexico city and brought to a close a three year bitter civil war which has come to be known as the Reform War (1857-1860). This war was fought with marked brutality as well as with a total disregard and wonton hatred towards the civilian population. The Liberal faction lead by Benito Juarez was the clear and decisive victor of the conflict. At the end of this war, the situation left Mexico with the burden of bloodshed without meaning, wars without hope, and chaos.

Once Benito Juarez found himself in the presidency, the scene which the country presented was one of overwhelming despair. The countryside was in ashes, the economy in shambles, the mines flooded, the population tired and weary of the new government, and the heavy burden of a colossal foreign debt threatened to eclipse the country. Pressures from outside proved too much for the fledgling government. At the same time, the defeated Conservatives appealed to the European powers of the period to intervene in Mexico to alleviate the situation.

Benito Juarez took action and with the stroke of a pen, he enacted a moratorium on the foreign debt owed to England, Spain, and France in order to refill the coffers of the state. Thus, setting the stage for yet another foreign intervention.

London, Paris, Madrid, and Washington had ideas of their own. The United States expansionists had their sights on more Mexican territory. The Yucatan which was seeking secession, was courting the English government for financial help; France had lingering ideas concerning the mythological wealth of the mines of Sonora; and Mexico was on the verge of collapsing and disappearing with land grabs from land-hungry foreign powers. Benito Juarez did not loose any time to enact his new reforms for the country on the brink of the abyss.

The news of the suspension of the foreign debt were ill received in London and Madrid, but welcomed in Paris. At last, the government of Napoleon III had an excuse to mount an expedition to Mexico. The United States was preoccupied with domestic matters and was about to plunged in a civil war of its own and thus, it could not do much to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. On January of 1862, a tripartite flotilla composed of English, Spanish, and French ships materialized off the coast of Veracruz for a blockade of the main port in Mexico thus, seizing the customs revenues as partial payment. England and Spain hoped for a quick resolution to the situation, but France had a hidden agenda. The Tratado de Soledad was signed by the Mexican Government but France refused to ratify the agreement and started to march to the interior. With most of their grievances settled and hoping to avoid the deadly climate of the Mexican coast, the Spanish and British forces quickly withdrew with their honor intact while French forces received reinforcements.

After the initial setback of May 5th, most of the center of the country quickly fell to French occupation. A delegation or Junta de Notables offered Archduke Maximilian of Hapsburg the crown of Mexico. Maximilian was the younger brother of Franz Joseph, the Austrian Emperor. Maximilian was crowned and received additional help from the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the form of troops and material. The French set up Maximilian’s government and was supported by European bayonets. As most of the country fell to the Foreigners, Benito Juarez was forced to take refuge in the north. In the north, the French influence and troops movements were slow due to the lack of resources and a strong Republican presence.
 

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The Northern Frontier

In the northern campaign the French were to encounter bands of independent guerrilla fighters that would attack and melt into the brush. The northerners had always had a reputation of being autonomous and hardy, something which the Austrian troops would find out in a brutal and intense way at the hands of these men.

On June 16, 1866 the Army of the North under General Mariano Escobedo met an Austro-Mexican force from well-prepared positions at the mesa of Santa Gertrudis. The foreigners were dealt a decisive military blow from which their northern theatre of operations would never recover. As a result, their position was shaken, demoralized, and the northern frontier was liberated for the extent of the war. The actions during that day in Santa Gertrudis immediately gained the status of legend and has been shrouded in hazy patriotism ever since. It has become difficult to discern truth from fiction. Many of the men present at the battle would go on to be influential military men of the Porfirio Diaz era until the eve of the revolution in 1910. The events of the battle culminated a week later on June 23 at the headquarters of General Tomas Mejia in Ranchito. General M. Escobedo entered the city of Matamoros shortly after that. Although the sequence of events leading to the capture of Matamoros was rapid, the true origins of the event go back more than two months or in mid April, 1866.

After the death of Pedro J. Mendez in the action of Tantoyoquita, M. Escobedo was commissioned by the government to form the Army of the North and he started doing so with men from Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. He was able to complete a force of 2,500 men and laid siege to Matamoros from the 17th to the 25th of October, 1865. He directed an assault on some fortifications but was pushed back with the loss of 300 men. M. Escobedo repeated the attack several times on Matamoros but was successfully beaten back on every occasion by the enemy. M. Escobedo finally made a strategic retreat and concentrated his troops in Camargo to rest and reorganize. On December 25, he made an unsuccessful attempt on Bagdad in conjunction with the commander of Brownsville and withdrew to the interior.

For most of the beginning of 1866, the Austrian and the Mexican Imperial troops lingered at Matamoros with small actions taken against each other. The Austrians, as well as the Imperial forces, remained isolated and unpaid. The Republicans only made occasional encroachments into the city during this period. For months, General Thun urged Archille Bazaine to embark and withdraw the Austrians from Matamoros. General Thun knew the plight of the Austrians and continued his efforts to convince General Bazaine. Finally, Bazaine agreed to recall the Austrians, but via the interior through Camargo, Mier, Cerralvo, and eventually Monterrey. General Thun protested the order vigorously but Bazaine kept his order. The strategy, as ordered by Gen. Bazaine, was for two convoys to leave simultaneously. One was to leave from Matamoros and another from Monterrey. They would exchange the convoys at Mier. The Austrians were to march to the interior and the French forces would escort their convoy to Matamoros thus, reinforcing the plaza.

 

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Genesis of the Battle

On or about mid-April the young Austrian Lt. Ernst Pitner stationed in Matamoros, recorded in his diary how they “undertook a small expedition to [El] Charco Escondido, where our troops met those of Col. Jeanningros… to discuss the further operations to be undertaken and then marched back again.” Col. Jeanningros had come from Monterrey. Unbeknown to Lt. Pitner, the meeting’s main concern was the planning of the expedition that would end in disaster at Santa Gertrudis two months later.

After several successful operations by his troops, acting with virtual independence against the enemy, M. Escobedo issues a proclamation in the city of Linares on May 27, 1866 praising and urging his troops to victory (See Enclosure No. 4). M. Escobedo next wanted to cut off the enemy between Monterrey and Saltillo and attack Matehuala to acquire material and men. M. Escobedo started the operation on Matehuala when he received intelligence reporting the departure of a large convoy from Monterrey.

On June 6th, Lt. Pitner recorded in his diary the following, “an order had arrived from Marshal Bazaine that the Austrian column stationed in Matamoros was to march to Mexico by land via Monterrey and that, should a convoy be leaving Matamoros, it should at the same time act as escort as well.” The convoy consisted of 200 wagons pulled by 2,000 mules and escorted by 950 infantrymen, 360 cavalrymen, and 130 artillery men for a total of 1,440 men. That same evening General Rafael Olvera marched out of Matamoros with the convoy under his command and camped on the outskirts to start the long march early on the 7th as their counterparts were doing the same in Monterrey. To Gen. Mejia, Gen. Olvera, Gen. De Tuce, and the Austrian’s misfortune, the Republicans were aware of their plans as soon as the Monterrey convoy left.

It is well established by Pitner and Alvenslenben that both convoys left their respective cities on the 7th of June. M. Escobedo somehow knew before the Monterrey convoy left, since he moved some troops to cut off reinforcements for the convoy heading to Cerralvo. M. Escobedo moved one division of infantry to China N.L. The 2nd cavalry brigade was moved to Paso del Zacate and the 1st brigade moved somewhere between Monterrey and Cerralvo. These troops were in place by the 7th which indicated that he knew about the convoy even before it left Monterrey. How M. Escobedo got this information, remains an enigma. How soon M. Escobedo got word of the Matamoros convoy leaving is revealed by the diplomatic dispatches of August 1st between Matias Romero and William Seward (See Enclosure No. 12). In enclosure number 12, M. Escobedo states that he found out about the Matamoros convoy on the 12th. M. Escobedo was watching Cerralvo when a dispatch from Gen. Tomas Mejia in Matamoros to De Tuce in Cerralvo was intercepted. Thus, M. Escobedo was not aware until late on the 12th of June about the Matamoros convoy. M. Escobedo decided then to attack the Matamoros convoy. The reasons why M. Escobedo decided to attack the Matamoros convoy is uncertain. Three assumptions can be made on the matter. First, M. Escobedo might have felt that the Matamoros convoy was an easier target since it was in the open and De Tuce had already fortified himself at Cerralvo by the 12th. Second, it can be that M. Escobedo felt that he could get more material from the Matamoros convoy. Third, M. Escobedo might have considered that he could persuade the Mexican Imperial forces to change sides, a common practice at the time. If M. Escobedo considered all these questions, he was right in all of them and especially when it came to the supplies as seen in the list of war materials captured after the action.

Once the convoy was well underway from Monterrey, M. Escobedo sprang into action. He sent Col. Pedro Martinez along with the governor of Coahuila with a column of 300 cavalry to harass Saltillo and cut off possible reinforcements for Gen. De Tuce. Simultaneously, he ordered Lt. Col. Antonio Garcia to cut off all communications with Monterrey. The plan was successful and Gen. De Tuce was on a one way road to Cerralvo. M. Escobedo knew not only the destination of both convoys but also the exact place where they were going to be exchanged, Mier. Indeed the original plan of the enemy was to exchange convoys in Mier. But, the captured dispatches in Cerralvo revealed that De Tuce changed his mind and planned to wait for Gen. Olvera at Cerralvo. Why or when De Tuce made the changes in his plans, is not clear. The only possible reason is that in the original plan they had agreed that in case any of the convoys were attacked, they were to hold out until the other force could render assistance. It seems that Gen. De Tuce thought it was too dangerous to proceed to Mier thus fortifying himself in Cerralvo. He could only hope that his counterparts would make it to Camargo, Mier and then join up with him at Cerralvo.

As soon as M. Escobedo learned that De Tuce was holding out in Cerralvo and Mier was out of the plan, he modified his plans and made some outstanding forced marches on the 13th, 14th, and the 15th. On those three days, he covered about 150 kms. He arrived in Camargo on the 15th at three o’clock in the morning. M. Escobedo’s troops had achieved a remarkable military feat by Mexican standards in those three days. The soldiers had not had water nor food since the 13th and were in no condition to engage the enemy the next day. Just before the break of dawn, Col. Juan Villarreal finished feeding and watering the troops and M. Escobedo ordered to proceed. At eleven o’clock in the morning of the 15th, M. Escobedo arrived with his army at la mesa del Ebanito and busied himself to prepare his troops for action on the nearby Mesa de Santa Gertrudis. He gave strict orders not to attack until they could pounce on their unsuspecting enemy.

M. Escobedo drew the battle lines and divided his army in five brigades and one reserve:

In the preliminary report done by M. Escobedo to President Benito Juarez, on the 16th in camp at Santa Gertrudis, he states that he only had 1,500 men. On the 19th (See Enclosure No. 10 ), M. Escobedo was in Camargo and makes another official dispatch to Benito Juarez in which he gives the breakdown of troops shown above who took part in the action of the 16th. M. Escobedo left out the amount of men in the two columns of cavalry of the 4th Brigade. Taken from this dispatch, 1,400 men are accounted for but it’s still unknown why M. Escobedo left out the two cavalry columns of the 4th Brigade or 300 men. Lt. Max Baron Von Alvensleben of the Mexican Imperial Army noted down in his diary that “General Escobedo, assisted by the United States, had thrown himself by forced marches in our front. His force consisted of 3,000 men and a six-pounder battery.” Although lost or left out on purpose, the number of M. Escobedo’s troops were probably closer to the 3,000 mark, if not over, as Alvensleben reported.

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The Skirmish
 

At five o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th when the Matamoros convoy was reaching the Mesa of Santa Gertrudis, some of M. Escobedo’s men disobeyed orders and attacked the convoy, thus alerting the enemy. The Austrian’s advance guard suffered a serious attack but captured a prisoner. From the prisoner, the Austrians learned of M. Escobedo’s plan. At about six o’clock of that same afternoon, the Austrians organized some men to gather intelligence. They made contact with the enemy, had some of their men killed, and were forced to return to their camp. The wagons were arranged in a defensive position around the gathering darkness, the night guard was doubled, and they settled down for an uneasy night. No account of any kind has survived about the restless night of the 15th on either side. During this time of the year, the nights are hot and silent. Alvensleben describes swarms of mosquitoes and how he could clearly hear the bell of the church in Camargo just a short distance away.

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The Battle

Early next morning at about four o’clock, Pitner recorded in his diary that the men took up their arms and about half an hour later, the convoy started to move out. The convoy was arranged in a defensive matter and drove them four in the middle. All of the Mexican Imperial troops stayed behind guarding the convoy. Most, if not all, of the Austrians took up the front. The 2nd and the 5th Austrian Rifle Companies formed two separate columns divided in sections with a half artillery battery (about six men) in the middle and immediately followed by one company of Zapadores with sixty men. At the same time, Captain Gomez with his seventy mounted Rurales kept watch on both flanks of the Austrians. With this formation of about 340 men, as Pitner reports, the Austrians and the Rurales were ready to meet an enemy 3,000+ strong.

At about six o’clock in the morning they made contact with the Republican troops. A small exchange of fire commenced but the Mexicans did not return fire too much. All the Austrians could see were horsemen riding the top of the hills and were quickly dispersed by a few well-place shells by the Austrian artillery. The Austrians advanced and took possession of a hill close at hand. From the top of the hill, Pitner could see the enemy moving out in close ranks in an offensive advance toward them. On their left flank, the Republican cavalry made a false charge and all of Captain Gomez’s Rurales fled in a panic. The Imperial Cavalry made a mock charge against the Republican Cavalry, turned back, and did not take part in the action. Shortly after that, the general firing commenced at very short range and Pitner observed that it was a moment of the most frightful small arms fire and the men in their ranks fell down dead in droves. After a few volleys, there was a pause in the firing on both sides and both sides fixed bayonets and the Austrians who were left got ready for the worst. It’s during this short pause that something happened which was omitted from the official Mexican report or any other official Republican account of the battle. According to Baron von Alvensleben, M. Escobedo used this short pause to send over someone with a truce banner and asked them to surrender. They refuse and thus their fate was sealed. This small event is unclear but maybe their refusal to surrender caused M. Escobedo to praise them for their courage after the action.

After fixing their bayonets, the Austrians performed a feat of courage second only to the French charge at Hacienda de Camarón. Fewer than 100 Austrian soldiers charged the opposing 3000 men but were quickly pushed back with heavy loses when another column of infantry appeared on their right flank and opened another front. By this time, more than half of the Austrians lay dead in the field and they had no choice but to fall back. The 2nd Rifle Company had already fallen back due to casualties and the heavy fire. Then, the 5th Company retreated as well. The 5th Company merged with the 2nd. Now the one conjoined company proceeded to make their way back to the convoy under a rainstorm of lead and Lt. Pitner remarked that “the ground was covered with dead and wounded.” During those moments of the frightful retreat, Baron von Alvensleben recorded that “Heaps of corpses, many headless, others atrociously mutilated, strewed the ground.” As the Austrians retreated, the Mexicans, with bayonets fixed, rushed the field killing everyone who was left standing or wounded and the tide did not stop until they reached the wagons. As the Imperial Mexican troops guarding the convoy saw the Republican lines rapidly approaching and closing in from all sides, the Imperial Infantry troops fixed their bayonets, turned their muskets upside down, and struck their bayonets in the ground with a thunderous dose of Viva la Libertad!

At about seven o’clock in the morning the slaughter was over. It was a one-sided victory for M. Escobedo and his men. Later on that same day, at about four o‘clock in the afternoon, some wagons started moving towards Camargo with the wounded. M. Escobedo stayed on the field long enough to write a preliminary dispatch to Benito Juarez (See Enclosure No. 11). All of the prisoners who were not harmed and able to walk were sent to Reynosa while all the wounded were piled up and locked for the night in the church at Camargo. Between two to three hundred of the wounded enemy were locked in the church, not a good prospect for those with serious injuries. Pitner recorded that “a place to lie down was nowhere to be found.” Pitner recalls that at least two nights were spent locked in the church and then they were transferred to a hospital somewhere in Camargo. Although the location of the hospital has been lost, it’s possible that the private home of somebody was used for the purpose. Many more of the prisoners died in custody due to lack of medical attention and neglect.
 

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Liberation

The news of the disaster traveled fast on both sides. One can only imagine the demoralizing effect the news had on Gen. De Tuce since they were his countrymen. De Tuce returned to Monterrey as soon as he heard about his comrades. Without any direction and thoroughly demoralized, the French troops left behind to hold Mier, began to pillage the town. The inhabitants abandoned the towns and took refuge in the hills surrounding Mier. For an entire week, the French practiced every kind of excess on property and terrorized the civilians who stayed behind. Their excesses even surpassed their Mexican counterparts who were veterans at the sport. After about a week of pillage they started withdrawing to Monterrey. A good number of the French deserted to the United States. On the march back to Monterrey, the French didn’t even bother chasing or putting up resistance to the Mexicans who were tailing them.

On the 19th of June, M. Escobedo makes his last dispatch from Camargo to Juarez concerning the battle (See Enclosure No. 12). M. Escobedo leaves Camargo to plan the final assault on Matamoros. The news reached Matamoros quickly and Gen. Tomas Mejia started preparations to abandon the town as soon as possible before the anticipated assault on his precarious position in Matamoros. No hope for reinforcements was left after the disaster at Santa Gertrudis, since all communications with the interior were cut off. Gen. Mejia knew that it wouldn’t be long before the Republicans made their final assault on Matamoros and this time they would succeed. Gen. Mejia realized that his condition as well as that of his remaining troops, were in danger of being overrun. Mejia moved out to Ranchito on the road to Bagdad, set up his headquarters there, and started drafting the decree to abandon Matamoros to the enemy on the 22nd of June. The next day, the agreement was singed by Gen. Mejia for the Empire and by Juan Jose de la Garza representing governor Jose M. J. Carvajal. The agreement was ratified at three o’clock in the morning of the 23rd and Mejia got ready to evacuate (See Enclosure No. 16). He moved out through the road leading to Bagdad unmolested with about 600 of his men and equipment, boarded a steamer, and landed in Tampico a few days later to reinforce that plaza, thus ending the military occupation of the northern frontier.
 

Conclusion

The action that day at Santa Gertrudis denied the enemy access to resources entering the theatre from Europe via the Rio Bravo. After 1866, the fight turned from a fight to defeat the Mexican Conservatives to a struggle to rid the country of the French. All of the Mexican chieftains put all their petty differences aside and joined the rush to encompass the last remaining French forces around Queretaro. For a while, all of the Mexican military men of the time focused on one common goal, expelling the French and attain a prominent position in the new government. A little more than a year after the action at Santa Gertrudis, Emperor Maximilian, Gen. Tomas Mejia, and Gen. Miguel Miramon were the last casualties of the war. Sadly, only a neglected monument now stands where so many brave men died so far from home.
 

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The Lost Dispatches of August 1st, 1866

Matias Romero, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, was in constant communication with William Seward, his counterpart in Washington. The diplomatic communications between the two never ceased even under difficult conditions. Mr. Romero was always on the run with the fragile Mexican Government . On August 1st, 1866, just a few days after the battle, Mr. Romero sent a dispatch so Mr. Seward and the United States Government would be informed of the desperate Mexican situation. Within these dispatches, there are several important and revealing enclosures pertaining to the Santa Gertrudis action. Col. Sostenes Rocha made a record in Camargo on June 17, 1866 just a day after the battle of the men killed and wounded on both sides, the ones taken prisoners of war after the action, and the material taken from the enemy.

These very dispatches have been lost and have never been published after the review by American Government. The last known date when these were published was 1867. After that date, they disappear. It is amazing that no historian has looked at these dispatches to gain insight of the battle and the people who participated in it. Only the enclosures that relate to the battle are reproduced in their entirety here for the first time in almost 140 years.

 

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Enclosure No. 4

Mariano Escobedo, General of the Republic and chief of the Army of the North, to the troops of his command:

COMPANINONS IN ARMS: The enemy having prepared a great combination to fight our forces, and, as announced by his chief Doual, to annihilate us, several Franco-traitor columns were set in motion on the march from Monterrey, Saltillo, and Matehuala. The proposed operations were nullified in a few moments, as may be said, for they were compelled to return to their former positions, and suffered greatly in their transit from desertions. There is scarcely a battalion constituting the first cavalry division but what has lost some soldiers through desertion. This simple fact, laying aside their hurried countermarch, which can well be termed a flight, manifests how demoralized and tired of fighting are those who have adhered to “the Austrian” and how anxiously they await the time when they can return to their homes, very, sorry, as they are, that they ever come to this country to cement a throne which is in open opposition to the conviction and will of the Mexican people.

That constancy and valor which are always the distinctive characteristics of great souls have ever animated the heroes of Paso de las Cabras, Villa de Guadalupe, Monterrey, San Salvador, and St. Isabel, and in many other combats in which the liberal arms were covered with glory.

Soldiers! The enemy has lost all hope of triumph. For this reason you see him flee whenever you approach. Despair has made its way in his midst, causing him to abandon his banners and seek yours.

Forward, braves! Forward! The Republic has a right to expect great things of you yet. There are many forced marches to be made, battles to be fought, enemies to conquer, and injuries to avenge. Will you fall back now when the enemy has almost given up all hopes of conquest? The valor you possess, the constancy and decision of your chiefs, and the good sense and feeling of the people everywhere, make us hope that you will not recede, and that you will not desist until you see your country happy and free.

Then will you have fulfilled your duty, and history will record your actions, and the future generations will bless your names.

MARIANO ESCOBEDO



LINARES, May 27, 1866.
 

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Enclosure No. 10

MEXICAN REPUBLIC-NORTHERN ARMY CORPS-GENERAL IN CHIEF.

I have the honor inform you of the splendid Republican victory at Santa Gertrudis, gained by my forces over the Austrians and traitors escorting a convoy of goods from Matamoros to Monterrey. I had only 1,500 men, with the 1st Tamaulipas Brigade, under Colonel Canales, while the enemy had 2,000. Trusting to superiority of numbers he attacked me in my entrenchments, where I was waiting. He had the advantage of artillery, too. The attack was violent, but my troops were not dismayed in the least; we reserved our fire till the enemy came close, then fired and charged bayonet, driving him back in great confusion.

The victory is complete, and though we have not yet struck our tents, we have picked up more than a thousand muskets and other arms, have captured all the artillery, six field pieces, two mountain pieces, and any quantity of ammunition; leaving more than four hundred killed on the field, most of them Austrians, a great many wounded, and over eight hundred prisoners, two hundred of whom are foreigners. Our loss is only two hundred killed and wounded. As soon as I can collect the particulars I will make a report of the battle.

I can not commend any one of my men in particular; all did their duty, fighting like good Mexicans for the honor of the republic and our national independence.

Please communicate this dispatch to the supreme magistrate of the nation, and felicitate him, in the name of the army corps of the north and the 1st Tamaulipas Brigade, on this day’s brilliant victory of the republic over its foreign enemies.

Independence and liberty!

In camp, 16th June, 1866.

M. ESCOBEDO

 

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Enclosure No. 11

MARIANO ESCBOEDO, GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC AND CHIEF OF THE NORTHERN ARMY CORPS, TO THE TROOPS THAT TOOK PART IN THE BATTLE OF SANTA GERTRUDIS:

COMPANIONS IN ARMS: The national arms are once more crowned with glory; your forced marches and untold hardships have not been useless, for the Austrians and traitors, though superior to you in numbers, have been forced to succumb to your courage and resolution. You have brought the usurper’s Austrian mercenaries to your feet to implore your clemency, and you, fierce in combat but generous in victory, like true soldiers of the republic, have been merciful to them. The men that appeared so mightily in your front not long ago exist no more; those not killed are wounded and prisoners; a few officers escaped, but their flags and treasures remain in our hands. Their chiefs, miserable cowards, had not the courage to brave death on the field of battle, but trusted their lives and safety to the fleetness of their horses.

Fellow soldiers, the invaded republic confides its salvation to the courage of its children, and I am sure they will protect it or perish in the attempt. One year ago we were fighting without resources, almost without hope, with nothing but our patriotism to sustain us, yet our faith in the national cause never wavered; now that the northern army is everywhere victorious who will dare to oppose it? Let us hasten onward, fellow soldiers, and capture Matamoros; then we can have time to rest. We will leave a guard to protect our rear, and then Monterrey and Saltillo will soon be ours; the frontier will be freed from the odious presence of the invaders and their accomplices; we will carry the war into the interior of the republic, and help our brothers to fight till our soil is rid of the slaves of Napoleon the Third. You know, fellow soldiers, we have always respected the law and the customs of society; go on, as you have don up to this time, battling with the enemy and protecting peaceful citizens, and our cause will surely triumph in the end. Then you can settle down quietly with your families, and hold up your head in pride at having done your duty, fighting for national independence and the honor of the republic.

CAMP AT SANTA GERTRUDIS, 16TH JUNE, 1866.

MARIANO ESCOBEDO

 

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Enclosure No. 12

MEXICAN REPUBLIC-NORTHERN ARMY CORPS-GENERAL IN CHIEF.

According to my promise on the 16th, I have the honor to give a complete report of the battle of Santa Gertrudis, which you will communicate to the citizen President.

I had already fixed my headquarters at Linares, when I was informed that the enemy from Matamoros and Monterrey had united to protect a convoy of merchandise and spice between the two cities. Without knowing whether to credit the report or not, I took the necessary precautions of stationing a division of infantry at China, the second cavalry brigade at Paso del Zacate, and the first brigade between Monterrey and Cerralvo. To cut off re-enforcements for the French column that had left Monterrey, I ordered Colonel Pedro Martinez to threaten Saltillo with 300 cavalry, assisted by the governor of Coahulia with his available force, while Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Garcia should watch every entrance to Monterrey, and prevent any communication.

When my forces were thus stationed, I learned that 1,500 French and 500 traitors had left Monterrey on the 7th. This report was soon confirmed by General Geronimo Treviño who was watching them, and annoying them in every possible way, blocking up the road, filling the wells and springs, and using every legal strategy to harass an enemy. In the meantime, I was expecting to hear of the enemy coming out of Matamoros as an escort to a caravan of goods for Monterrey; but Colonel Canales, who was on the lookout, couldn’t obtain no such information. I then determined to march out to meet the French, which I did on the 9th, stopping the first night at Aldamas. On the 10th, I came within ten leagues of Cerralvo, where I remained the 10th and 12th, watching the enemy. The French got to Cerralvo on the 12th, and I learned from a captured messenger from Mejia to De Tuce, that they would not leave there until they heard the convoy had got to Mier. For this reason I changed my plan of operations, and by forced marches reached Santa Gertrudis, three leagues from the enemy, on the 15th. Knowing the enemy would be obliged to advance, as there was not enough water for his 2,000 mules, I prepared for battle in the following manner: I divided my forces into five columns for attack, and one for reserve. Colonels J.A. Flores and Luis G. Cazares, over the 1st infantry column of 250 men, with the 1st brigade. The second column, of the same number of men, was commanded by Colonels Miguel Palacios and Edelmiro Mayer. The third, of 300 men by Colonels Francisco Naranjo and Adolfo Garza. Fourth, the Tamaulipas brigade, of 300 rifles, under Servando Canales and Julian Cerda, with two columns of cavalry. Fifth, composed of the northern legion, under Joaquin Garza Leal, and the Lampazos explorers, under Juan N. Saenz and Higinio Villarreal, all under the command of General Geronimo Treviño. The reserve of 300 men, sappers, sharpshooters, and riflemen of the Rio Grande, was commanded by Colonel Salvador F. de la Cavada and Lieutenant Colonel Vicente Mariscal.

Thus divided, the columns were sent into the field to await the enemy, who soon appeared, leaving his baggage in the rear. On the 16th, at six in the morning, the enemy opened upon us with his cannon while the infantry continued to advance slowly. My orders were implicitly obeyed; the men lay flat on the ground, the cavalry concealed in a thicket of trees. The enemy continued to advance until he got within rifle-shot of our lines, when I ordered my men to charge. This was done bravely; the infantry continued to advance, until both armies had to combat with side arms. The enemy feigned an attack on our left with two infantry columns, and attempted to surrounds us. At this moment I ordered the cavalry to charge, and General Treviño made a bold assault on the right. This was so successful that the enemy was completely flanked on the left. The combat with side arms was of short duration, having ended at seven in the morning, with the complete destruction of the austro-traitor forces.

I enclose a report of the killed and wounded (No.1) on both sides, and of the prisoners we have taken. No.2 is a list of artillery, arms, etc., taken from the enemy. No. 3 is a list of the prisoners. The traitors are not included, because they are incorporated into our ranks. No. 4 is a general sketch of the battle.

I cannot make particular recommendations, because, as I said, every man did his duty convinced of the justice of the cause, our soldiers had no doubt of victory, and marched forward certain of success. During the combat there were many personal encounters worthy of the greatest admiration.

As a consequence of this glorious triumph of the national cause, the garrison in Matamoros is thrown into the greatest confusion, and, to take advantage of it, I will march upon the place tomorrow, hoping to be able to give you an early account of my expedition.

Before concluding I must praise this army under my command for its excellent conduct and discipline, and recommend it to the notice of the citizen President of the Republic, with whom I rejoice at this signal triumph of our glorious cause.

Independence and Liberty! Camargo June, 19, 1866.

M. ESCOBEDO.

THE MINISTER OF WAR AND MARINE of the Republic, (wherever he may be).

CAMARGO, June 20, 1866.
 

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Enclosure No. 13

NORTHERN ARMY CORPS-HEADQUARTERS

KILLED

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WOUNDED

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PRISONERS OF WAR

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LIST OF ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION, TOOLS, ARMS, GUN-CARRIAGES, CARTRIDGE BOXES, ETC

TAKEN FROM TEH ENEMY AFTER THE BATTLE.
 

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LIST OF MEXICANS KILLED

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AUSTRIAN PRISONERS TAKEN AFTER THE ACTION

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Enclosure No. 16



AGREEMENT FOR THE SURRENDER OF MATAMOROS

In the heroic city of Matamoros, on this twenty-second day of June, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-six, at a meeting of citizen General D. Thomas Mejia and a commission of the people, consisting of Señores D. Augustin Menchaca, D. Juan Prado, and D. Antonio de la Garza Chapa, of the first part, and citizens General D. Juan de la Garza, acting under the authority and in accordance with the instructions of the citizen governor and military commander of Tamaulipas, General Jose M. J. Carvajal, for the purpose of treating for the surrender of the plaza, after the usual formalities, agreed upon the terms contained in the following articles:

ARTCLE 1. General Mejia is to deliver up the plaza of Matamoros within forty-eight hours to the citizens General Juan de la Garza, commanding the division operating against Matamoros.

ARTICLE 2. The reception of the plaza will be according to the usual formalities, including the forces and armament of the plaza.

ARTICLE 3. General Mejia shall be permitted to withdraw with the troops of his division unmolested by the road to Bagdad, with two rounds of ammunition.

ARTICLE 4. The lives, property, and interests of the citizens are guaranteed, and they shall not be molested for their previous political conduct or opinions.

ARTICLE 5. The government of the State reserves the right to investigate the conduct of those who have taken the more prominent part against it, for the satisfaction of public justice.

For the enforcement and carrying out of the foregoing agreement, we hereby sign in triplicate.

THOMAS MEJIA

JUAN PRADO

ANTONIO DE LA GARZA CHAPA

AGUSTIN MENCHACA

JUAN JOSE DE LA GARZA

Ratified at general headquarters, Ranchito, June 23, 1866 at 3:00 o’clock a.m.

CARVAJAL
 

1. Kelley, 124.

2. Galindo, Vol II, 77. On July 17, 1861 the law was to take effect. Article 1 of the law describes how as of that date, the government would receive all of the monies generated in the country. Furthermore, all payments of the foreign debt claimed by any foreign power would be suspended for a period of two years.

3. Dabbs, 22. The Convention of La Soledad ended with the signing of a treaty by the same name. Mexico agreed to further negotiations of claims against it. Also, it permitted the invading troops to move to more healthy areas further inland but in case the negotiation broke down, the troops were to fall back to their original positions on the coast.

4. In March of 1864, Maximilian received in his palace at Triste, Italy a Mexican delegation that offered him the Mexican throne.

5. Alvarez, Vol 9, 5174. Tantoyoquita is small village in Tamaulipas. On January 23, 1866, Pedro Jose Mendez made an audacious night attack of the French fortifications in the village aiming to destroy a convoy of goods and take possession of 200,0000 pesos. Mendez was mortally wounded and died the next morning.

6. Saldivar, 235. M. Escobedo had the misfortune of attacking during a heavy rain and could not get reinforcements. He was never able to take Matamoros by force.

7. Jewison and Steiner. Franz Graf Thun-Hohenstein (1826-1888). General and commander of the Austrian Volunteer Corps. His commission was dated the 15th of August 1864. In Mexico he was honored with the award of the Bronze Military Merit Medal and the grand officer's cross (commander's cross with breast star) of the Order of our beloved Madonna of Guadalupe. In his return to Austria he was honored by Kaiser Franz Joseph with the award of the 2nd class of the Order of the Iron Crown with war decoration.

8. Bazaine, Francois Archille was born in Versailles on February 13, 1811. He arrived in Mexico in 1862 taking over Gen. Forey and served as civil administrator for all the occupied districts. He left Mexico in February of 1867 and died in 1888.

9. Dabbs, 70. Jeanningros, Pierre Jean Joseph (1816-1902). Col. Jeanningros served with distinction in the Crimean War (1854-1856), the Italian Campaign of Napoleon III (1859). He was sent to Mexico in charge of the French Foreign Legion in 1860 where he would reach immortality by being associated with the battle at Hacienda de Camarón.



10. Coke, 37. Col. Jeanningros was in charge of 5,000 troops composed of both Foreign Legion as well as Mexican Imperial troops in the district of Monterrey.

11. Pitner, 129. Lt. Pitner keep a very accurate account of the force. The tone of his writing reveals how demoralized he was after the battle. By writing about the strength and material of his force, he seems to justify the disaster that occurred that day. He is very clear and concise about it as if he was going to be questioned by his superiors later on.

12. Not much is known about Gen. Rafael Olvera. The date of his arrival in Matamoros is vague but he probably arrived with Gen. Mejia. Pitner describes him as a terrible military man. Also, M. Escobedo criticizes the leaders of the Imperial troops as cowards for leaving their men at Santa Gertrudis. It can be safely assumed that he made it back to Matamoros and left with Mejia to fight another day.

13. The route the convoy was to take from Matamoros to Mier was not an easy one and was plagued with difficulties. It is even more difficult to reconstruct since no record exists. Again, according to Lt. Pitner, the route they followed is remarkable. On the 7th, they departed Matamoros and marched 8 leagues, five men died of heatstroke, and continued on an additional 5 leagues, losing three more men and spent the night at Santa Rosalia. The next day, on the 8th, they marched five leagues to Lagunitas and had three additional deaths from heatstroke. Next day after a march of 4 leagues, they arrived at a ranch named Gancho late on the 9th. Late on the 10th, after a march of 3 leagues, they arrived to a place called Artesitas. On the 11th , they made it to Jacalitos. The night of the 12th was spent at an abandoned ranch after a 6 league march and had about 60 sick men from eating tunas. The 13th finds them at another abandoned ranch. By the 14th they march 3 leagues and make it to another abandoned ranch; during this day, they have a confrontation with a band of the enemy, exchange fire, including artillery, and they had one man killed and three wounded. On the 15th they make it to the mesa of Santa Gertrudis.

14. No account survives as to the path taken by the convoy from Monterrey. It can be safely assumed that they took the old road going out of Monterrey to Mier. The road passed by the villages of Marin, Papagallos, Pesqueria Chica, Higueras, Cerralvo, Punta Agudo, and finally Mier.

15. Alvarez, Vol. 9, p 5168. Tomas Mejia (1820-1867). Mexican military man who fought against the Apache Indians in the North of Mexico. He defended the city of Monterrey against the American invasion. He supported Maximilian until the end and was executed alongside him.

16. Col. Ruperto Martinez plays a small roll in the events in this study. M. Escobedo sends him to cut off Saltillo and is not mentioned anymore in any of the accounts. He did not participate in the action but he reappears during the siege of Queretaro. His role after the intervention is vague.

17. Little is known about Col. Juan Villarreal. M. Escobedo only mentions Villarreal once and then disappears from the historical record. One can only assume that he was native of the vicinity and returned to civilian life soon after the battle or the collapse of the empire.

18. Pitner, 132. No surviving account describes what kind of wagons these were. Lt. Pitner only describes them as being able to carry a heavy load. Not being the only one who took refuge in the wagons, their structural strength must have been able to stop musket balls.

19. Dictionary.com: A military engineer who specializes in field fortification activities.

20. Nothing is knows about Capt. Gomez. Pitner mentions him briefly as being in charge of the Rurales aiding the Imperial Army. He accompanied the convoy out of Matamoros and protected the rear. During the action at Santa Gertrudis, the Rurales were the first ones to abandon the field and probably headed to Matamoros under forced marches. He completely disappears from the historical record.

21. Lt. Pitner was in a section that got separated from the 5th company. Before the general firing started, his section rejoined the company and fell into formation just 300 paces opposite from the Mexican lines. It seems that Pitner was right at the front Most of the 1st and 5th Austrian Rife Companies were wipe out. From the subsequent list of prisoners done by Col. Sostenes Rocha in Camargo after the battle, about seventy-five percent of the Austrian force was killed. Col. Rocha’s list of prisoners illustrates this point. All of the Austrians left were from the artillery and very few soldiers. Lt. Pitner received a severe wound in the throat but was able not only to survive the battle but also the harsh treatment of his captivity, and eventually escaped to return to fight for Maximilian. He was evacuated with the last remaining French troops before Maximilian was captured. He died of old age in Austria.

22. Jeremy, 1. On April 30th, 1863 a detachment of 65 French Foreign Legion soldiers under Capt. Danjou while escorting a convoy successfully held off 2,000 Mexican soldiers. On the last moments of the battle after exhausting their supply of cartridges, five legionnaires fix bayonet and charged the Mexican lines. Nowhere in Mexico, during the French intervention, a charge such as this one occurred. Col. Sostenes Rocha reported only 143 Austrians taken prisoners. Taking this into account, the charge was hardly different as the one in April 30, 1863. Since the whole Austrian expedition was an embarrassment for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, it is a sad fact that the courageous actions of the Austrians in Santa Gertrudis that day were forgotten and buried rather then eulogized. For the most part, they fought for each other rather than to protect the convoy or the Empire.

23. Pitner, 134. Although Pitner viewed this action as a sign of cowardice, it was a common practice at the time for Mexican troops to switch sides and throw in their luck with the prevailing faction. Since many of these men were force recruits, their loyalty was on keeping their lives and not keeping the Empire buoyant.

24. Alvensleben, 69, 206. How many prisoners were marched to Reynosa and how long they stayed there is unknown. Since most of the Mexican Imperial troops changed sides, only the Austrians who were unhurt were marched to Reynosa. Also, it can only be assumed that the Mexican Army sent them under a strong guard since Capt. Gomez and his Rurales, loyal to the Empire, were still roaming the vicinity. Alvensleben reports that as late as November 12, he found some Austrian prisoners, one was a sergeant who lost an arm in Santa Gertrudis, taken at Camargo and imprison in the hospital in Matamoros. One of them wrote a letter from the hospital to Alvensleben asking for help. Alvensleben kept the identity of the prisoners concealed by using only their initials. The prisoners were Corporal S. from the 1st Company of the 2nd Battalion, Private F. of the 1st Company from 1st jä ger battalion, Sergeant H. of the 3rd company from the 2nd jä ger battalion, and the author of the letter F.M. of the 2nd Company from the 2nd jä ger battalion.

25. Garza Saenz, 86. The church Nuestra Señora de Sta. Ana de Camargo was started in 1767 and the construction was completed in 1816. It is precisely this church that appears in all of the accounts. No other church was functioning in Camargo since Nuestra Señora de San Agustin de Laredo (1750) was subsequently damaged and lost during the war for independence in 1812.

26. Dabbs, 172. Dabbs reports that only 70 men got back to Matamoros with the news of the disaster. No record remains of who reported this to Gen. Mejia. It can only be assumed that Capt. Gomez and his 60 Rurales rush to Matamoros with the news and to safety.

27. Alvarez, Vol. 12, 6993. Rocha, Sostenes was born on 1831 in Mineral de Marfil, Guanajuato and died in Mexico City in 1897. Rocha entered the Colegio Militar in 1853 and saw action during the Plan de Ayutla in 1854. Early on, he was a firm Conservative and fought alongside them in 1856 when Puebla was taken. In 1857 he embraced the Liberal cause under Juarez and fought for the cause in Sierra Gorda (1857) and Salamanca (1858) and was with Gen. Santos Degollado during the fall of Guadalajara. He was made prisoner by the invading French army but managed to escape, rejoined Benito Juarez, and escorted him to Paso del Norte. He also took part in the siege of Queretaro and was raised to Brigadier General for his efforts. After the expulsion of the French, he kept his loyalty to the Porfirio Diaz government until his death in 1897.

28. Garza Saenz, 124. In the list Lt. Col. Salvador Iglesias is listed as killed in action. In reality, M. Escobedo ordered Lt. Col. Iglesias to be shot in Camargo.



 

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